Abstract: This article deals with a theological treatise that has been wrongly ascribed to the Imāmī scholar al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā (d. 436/1044). The treatise discusses the question of human agency in relation to divine decree and determining, arguing for positions that, to a large extent, resemble Murtaḍā's known views. Nevertheless, the treatise also betrays features incompatible with Murtaḍā's theology as a whole, in addition to stylistic and bibliographical questions that make a good case against the work's authenticity. This wrong ascription, however, has not been noted despite the repeated editions of the text in the Islamic world. As such, it misrepresented many of Murtaḍā's views, sometimes undermining the main pillars of his theological system. The author of the treatise establishes his ethical concepts on the basis of scriptural dictates before proceeding to rational arguments, relies on non-multi-attested reports, defers to the authority of the Prophet's companions and culls God's names and attributes from the word of revelation. While going against Murtaḍā's positions, these views -put togetherare considerably closer to non-Imāmī doctrines, and could have easily been the work of a Muʿtazilī author.
its iron grip under which Imāmīs had lived for almost two centuries, when their participation in authority was limited to a few notable families some of whose members held bureaucratic offices. 3 The death of the eleventh Imam al-Ḥasan al-῾Askarī in 260/873 had left Imāmīs for the first time without a present Imam, generating a major crisis that compelled the community to devise new forms of management to sustain itself. Later known as the Minor Occultation, taken to have ended in 329/941, the effects of this crisis were still very much in evidence when the Būyids arrived. 4 Their advent may have alleviated some of the strain that Imāmīs were living under, now that their political position had taken a turn for the better. The Būyids were to maintain control of Baghdad for a long century, only to be replaced by the Saljuqs in 447/1055.
The Būyid age was markedly one of tolerance and constituted a heyday of intellectual activity, termed both 'the Shīʽī century' 5 and 'the renaissance of Islam' 6 . Probably owing to both their status as a minority sect and their not-soprivileged ethnic background, the Būyids showed exceptional acceptance of religious and cultural diversity. 7 It is thus that debates on various matters were often held at the monarch's court and in his presence. 8 Many members of the ruling elite under the Būyids were men of learning, especially the viziers, a few of whom were among the great belle-lettrists of Islam like Ibn al-ʿAmīd (d. 360/970) and al-Ṣāḥib b. ʿAbbād (d. 385/995) , to mention but two examples. 9 These influential political figures in turn had their own courts where they hosted the leading intellectuals of the time, in this sometimes competing with their masters. The Būyids also paid considerable attention to the pre-Islamic Iranian heritage, reviving the Persian title 'Shāhānshāh' and some aspects of Sasanid rule while respecting the Islamic nature of government by nominally preserving allegiance to the caliph. 10 stronger inclination towards Imāmism than did their relatives elsewhere, and that the second and third generation Būyids primarily gravitated toward Imāmism while first generation Būyids were Zaydīs. Their profession of the Ismāʿīlī creed, a claim not found in neutral sources, must have been very circumscribed and short-lived. On their religious identity see Busse 1969: 604-605; Cahen 1979; Kraemer 1986: 39-44 . Recent studies tend to stress their Imāmī affiliation even more; see Marcinkowski 2001: 201-202 . 3 For a succinct survey of the prominent Imāmī families and their respective relations see Newman 2000: 19-26 . 4 See Abdulsater 2011: passim for a discussion of the development of the Imāmī theological system and its undergirding communal ideology at the time. 5 The Shīʽī color of the era as seen by a Sunnī intellectual is described in al-Qāḍī 2003: passim. 6 For a discussion of the appellation see Kraemer 1986 : 1-5. 7 Busse 1969: 605-606; Kraemer 1986 : 75-80. 8 Kraemer 1986 On them see Kraemer 1986: 241-259 and 259-272 respectively. 10 Busse 1969: 603-604; Madelung 1969: 181-183; Kraemer 1986: 44-46. In addition to their support for religious scholars of different sects, the Būyids showed great respect for Imāmī scholars who had never before won government favor. The age represented the first period in Islamic history when Imāmīs were not only absolutely free to practice their beliefs and develop their creed publicly, but their religious leaders also enjoyed the patronage of political authority, be it in Rayy or in Baghdad. 11 Extant are famous debates between Imāmī ʽulamāʼ and other scholars in the presence of Būyid princes where they openly challenged other schools and creeds; 12 a favorable change whose importance should not be underestimated. The relationship between the Būyids and Imāmīs was a win-win situation: the Būyids needed popular support to balance the Sunnī support for the caliph; the Imāmīs, now without their Imam and therefore politically benign, needed political cover. 13 This situation can best be seen, though in retrospect, in comparison with the subsequent plight of the Imāmīs, particularly their prominent scholars, in the aftermath of the Būyid downfall. 14 2 ʿAlam al-Hudā ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (d. 436/1044), also known as al-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, was one of the leading figures of the Būyid age. 15 An ῾Alid, he was a scion of the seventh Imāmī Shīʿī Imam Mūsā al- Kāẓim (d. 183/799) . In addition to this noble lineage, his more immediate ancestors and relatives were also of high regard: his maternal great grandfather was the Zaydī Imam al-Ḥasan al-Uṭrūsh (d. 304/917), the third ruler of the Zaydī dynasty of Ṭabaristān and eastern Gīlān (250/864-520/1126) under the title al-Nāṣir al-Kabīr. 16 His father Abū Aḥmad alḤusayn b. Mūsā (d. 400/1009), known as al-Ṭāhir al-Awḥad and Dhū al-Manāqib, combined both religious prestige and political stature. He served as the chief syndic of the descendents of Abū Ṭālib (naqīb al-ṭālibiyyīn) 17 for five terms, 18 in addition to being the commander of the pilgrims (amīr al-ḥajj) , 19 taking responsibility for people's complaints to court (wilāyat al-maẓālim) 20 and acting twice as a peacemaker between the Būyids of Baghdad and the Ḥamdānīs of Mosul 21 . Murtaḍā's younger brother Muḥammad (d. 406/1015) , known as al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, was a renowned poet 22 and a politician who assumed the office of the syndicate after his father; 23 but he mainly owes his fame to his compilation of the sayings, sermons and letters of the first Shīʿī Imam ῾Alī b. Abī Ṭālib (d. 40/661) under the title Nahj al-Balāgha 24 . The two titles Murtaḍā and Raḍī were both royal gifts: in a decree dated 397/1006, the Būyid king Bahāʾ al-Dawla (r. 379/989-403/1012) bestowed on ʿAlī b. al-Ḥusayn the title al-Murtaḍā Dhū al-Majdayn, apparently alluding to both his noble ancestry and personal qualities; Muḥammad, on the other hand, was given the title al-Raḍī Dhū al-Ḥasabayn. 25 In addition to his political influence and social prominence primarily owing to his thirty-year tenure as the syndic of the descendents of Abū Ṭālib following his brother's death and his close association with both the ʿAbbāsid and Būyid dynasties, 26 he was an authority on language and literature. As for his mastery of religious sciences, it was not confined to any particular discipline; he wrote extensively on jurisprudence, law, Qurʾānic exegesis and theology. As such, he was one of the icons of the Būyid ethos, not only in his well-roundedness and diverse knowledge but also in his efforts to systemize the Imāmī system of faith, simultaneous with the efforts of other masters of contending schools of theology.
Murtaḍā markedly represents the atmosphere of relative freedom that the Imāmīs enjoyed; his contributions to the formation of an integral Imāmī discourse are foundational. In theology, his prolific output shows immense erudition, as he presented a system of Imāmī beliefs whose elaborateness is unmatched by any extant 17 Havemann 1993 : passim. 18 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995 -1996 Ibn al-Athīr 1965 : 8: 565-566, 710, 9: 77-78, 105, 182, 219. 19 See Māwardī 1966 Farrāʾ 1966 : 108-115. 20 See Nielsen 1991 Māwardī 1966: 77-95; Farrāʾ 1966 : 74-90. 21 Ibn al-Athīr 1965 . 22 For an analysis of some of his poetry see Stetkevych 2007: 293-293 for his career; see also Djeblī 1997: passim. 23 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995 -1996 Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 263 . 24 The authenticity of Nahj al-Balāgha has been a controversial issue from early times, at least before its great commentary by Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd (d. 656/1258) was written; Djeblī 1997: 33-56. 25 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995 -1996 Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 189; see Murtaḍā's poem thanking the king for the title in Murtaḍā 1998a: 1: 403-406. 26 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995 -1996 Ibn al-Athīr 1965: 9: 77-78, 105. system from before his time. Murtaḍā's theological legacy includes a lengthy summa, al-Dhakhīra fī ʿIlm al-Kalām, 27 38 In addition to the strong bond between masters and disciples in the traditional Islamic world of learning, Murtaḍā's finances must have guaranteed 27 Initially intended as an independent work, al-Dhakhīra ended up being a complement to the unfinished al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī Uṣūl al-Dīn as Murtaḍā himself explains; Murtaḍā 1990a: 607. Therefore, the two works must be seen as one whole. 28 Murtaḍā 2009: 31-32 also refers the reader to his works on theology (i.e. al-Shāfī and al-Dhakhīra) and his Rasāʾil where he elaborated on some questions such as consensus, reports and analogical reasoning, which serves to prove that this work is still earlier than Ṭūsī's ʿUdda, despite the latter's earlier public circulation as might be construed from Ṭūsī 1997b: 1: 3-4. The late Calder was apparently unaware of Murtaḍā's Dharīʿa, as he describes his jurisprudential work as "short, uncertain and lacking in detail; " Calder 1989 : 60. 29 Ibn Khallikān 1993 -1994 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 66; Amīn 1997: 3: 634-635; Khūʾī 1990: 4: 283. 36 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 53-54; Amīn 1997: 9: 400-401; Khūʾī 1990: 17: 357-358 . 37 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 169-170; Amīn 1997: 7: 70-72; Khūʾī 1990: 9: 177 . 38 Ibn Shahrāshūb 1961: 115; Amīn 1997: 8: 18; Khūʾī 1990: 11: 42-43. him the 'acquired loyalty' of his students thanks to the concept of gratitude due for benefit rendered (shukr al-niʿma) . 39 Despite his prominence and massive oeuvre, relatively little has been written on Murtaḍā's thought. In Western languages, two monographs offer a partial treatment of his contributions. First, there is the last chapter of McDermott's The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufīd. 40 The chapter briefly presents the points of disagreement between Mufīd and Murtaḍā. Naturally, it does not exhaust all these points nor does it provide a systematic exposé of Murtaḍā's theological contribution as this is not the focus of the book. The other monograph is Madelung's A Treatise of the Sharīf al-Murtaḍā on the Legality of Working for the Government (Masʾala fī 'l-ʿamal maʿa 'l-sulṭān) . It consists of an edition of the Arabic text and an English translation, together with an introduction and concluding remarks on works dealing with related topics in the later tradition. In Arabic, almost all published studies on Murtaḍā are concerned with his literary works, whether in poetry or rhetoric and literary criticism. The only exception is a work studying his view on transmission of traditions, mainly covering his rejection of non-multiattested reports. 41 His theological works are mentioned tangentially, usually in the introduction. However, there exists an unpublished dissertation on his theology presented to the University of Zliten, Libya, by Raʾūf al-Shammarī in 2004. Despite its usefulness in many respects, it is noteworthy that it suffers from three main flaws: first, only Arabic material is used for both primary and secondary sources; second, the author is not aware of the publication of Murtaḍā's most comprehensive theological work, i.e. al-Dhakhīra, among other books of his and third, the dissertation is replete with its author's subjective views on controversial questions as to whether Murtaḍā is right or wrong on each and every point. Although Murtaḍā's theological contributions do not seem to have been studied independently in Iranian scholarship, several works have been produced covering his career in general and the religious aspects of his poetry. Translations of some of his works into Persian and a limited Arabic secondary literature on him are also available.
An even more interesting aspect concerning Murtaḍā's reception in the later Imāmī tradition is the number of works spuriously ascribed to him. Thus far, the author of the current article has been able to identify three works that most likely are erroneously ascribed to 42 39 Mottahedeh 1980: 72-78 43 and Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar -which is the subject of this study. The identification of these problematic works was done by the author in tandem with the larger project of his doctoral dissertation, concerned with studying Murtaḍā's theology and jurisprudence. 44 
al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq
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In what is often termed as the fusion of Muʿtazilī and Imāmī theology, 45 Murtaḍā's role has been noted in both primary and secondary literature; many non-Imāmī heresiographers went even as far as classifying him as a Muʿtazilī 46 or proMuʿtazilī. 47 What matters most, for the purposes of this article, is that the concurrence of Imāmī and Muʿtazilī theology is most felt on two major subjects: divine unicity (with the pertinent issues of divine essence and attributes, including speech) and divine justice (with the relevant questions of human agency, divine help, moral theory and otherworldly deserts of acts). This is why the Imāmīs felt, early 43 The author is currently preparing a separate article on the question of the authenticity of al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq. It suffices to say here that, unlike the other two works, doubts have been expressed about its ascription to Murtaḍā, though no reason for these doubts is provided; Naẓarī 2008: 32: 26. 44 See Abdulsater 2013: passim. 45 The debate on whether the Imāmīs incorporated Muʿtazilī doctrines or developed their own views independently is beyond the scope of the current discussion; each of the two opinions has its supporters. For classical heresiographies, see Khayyāṭ 1925: 6; Ashʿarī 1980: 35; Shahrastānī 1992: 1: 145, 166; Ibn Taymiyya 1903 -1904 . In recent scholarship, see for example Nashshār 1977: 1: 414-415; Jadʿānī 2001: 1: jīm-dāl, 371-372; Sourdel 1972 : 233-234. See also McDermott 1978 McDermott 1977: 223 where he states that Imāmīs, even before Mufīd, had some Muʿtazilī-leaning theologians ; Madelung 1970: 15, 17, 25, 28; Jafri 1978: 305-306 ; Halm 2004: 49-50; Momen 2005: 79-82; Yann 1995: 5-6; Newman 2000: 20, 26 . All these studies argue, mutatis mutandis, that the Imāmīs fell under Muʿtazilī influence, at least partially on the level of some leading figures. For the other viewpoint inclined more to stress the independence or originality of Imāmī theology, with its different versions and the various extents to which such independence is stressed, see for example Ṭahrānī 1983: 1: 39, 5: 44-45, 8: 56; Amīn 1997: 1: 127; Amīnī 1997: 4: 66-67; Niʿma 1985: 23-25; Mughniyya 1979: 110-111; Niʿma 1961: 39-41; Ḥasanī 1964: 14-15, 279-284; Amīnī 1997: 24-25; Ṭabāṭabāʾī 1970 -1974 Gurjī 1984: 43-47; Akhtar 1986: 102-115; Muhajirani 2008: 179, 181; ʿAbd al-Ghaffār 1996: 423; Khāminahʾī 1992: 199-210; Jaʿfarī 1992: 164-165; Abrahamov 2006: 208; Modarresi 1993 : 115-116. 46 Dhahabī 1987 Dhahabī 1995: 17: 589; Ṣafadī 2000: 20: 231; Ibn Ḥajar 1997 : 4: 223. 47 Ibn al-Jawzī 1995 -1996 on, that they are no less entitled to the epithet 'Upholders of [Divine] Unicity and Justice' (ahl al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl ) than the Muʿtazilīs. 48 Where Murtaḍā agrees with Muʿtazilī theology, he champions the positions of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs against that of the Baghdadi Muʿtazilīs which his master, Mufīd, had adopted. 49 Among the questions of the latter point, Murtaḍā fully endorsed the Baṣran Muʿtazilī view of human agency; human acts, he believes, are purely done by humans, without God intervening in any form. 50 He vehemently argued, not only against pure determinists (mujbira) who adopted the blunt position that humans are mere helpless tools of God's power whose acts are as unaffected by their efforts as are their colors or bodily traits, but also against the upholders of acquisition (kasb) who attempted to tread a middle-path between what they saw as the two extremes of absolute human independence and helplessness. Murtaḍā's position was to deny the intelligibility of acquisition, while still equating it, if it is to be given any meaningful content, to pure determinism in that they both boil down to infringement on God's justice and disavowal of human power. 51 Likewise, Murtaḍā's moral theory shows his acceptance of the Muʿtazilī view that the moral value of certain acts is known independently from revelation. 52 He, nonetheless, parted from the Muʿtazilī theory of divine justice on the question of divine help (luṭf); while adopting the doctrine of divine help as defined by the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs, he pushed it farther to make it the cornerstone of his theory of the necessity of the Imāma as a means of bringing people closer to salvation due to the moral benefit accruing from the presence of an infallible leader of the community in whom authority and political power reside. 53 In light of that, he might be considered the main influence behind the Imāmī position that the Imāma is necessary not to guarantee the complete transmission of religious law, but to preserve the moral order of society. He also rejected the Muʿtazilī dogma of the Threat (waʿīd ), i.e. the inevitability of God punishing sinners in the hereafter, arguing that it is not morally problematic to pardon grave sinners -and 1986: 1: 47, 99; Murtaḍā 1990a: 410; Murtaḍā 1998b: 191-192; Murtaḍā 1995: 35-36; Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 thus God might do it, 54 a scenario whose ultimate execution is seen through the effect of the intercession (shafāʿa) of the Prophet and the Imams. 55 In the above points of concurrence and disagreement with Muʿtazilī thought, Murtaḍā's writings betray a strong influence of his elder contemporary, the great Muʿtazilī theologian of the Baṣran school Qāḍī al-Quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār alAstrabādī (d. 415/1024). 56 The phrasing of the two authors is almost identical in many instances in cases of both agreement 57 and disagreement 58 . Also, Murtaḍā's main work on the Imāma, al-Shāfī fī al-Imāma, was written as a rebuttal against the corresponding volume of al-Mughnī, with sharp criticisms 59 and copious quotations 60 provided by Murtaḍā before he embarks on his refutations; the same can be said, though to a lesser extent, about his al-Dharīʿa 61 . 1990a: 509-521; Murtaḍā 1998b : 151-155. 55 Murtaḍā 1990a Murtaḍā 1998b: 158-158; Murtaḍā 1954: 2: 306; Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 Murtaḍā 1998a : 1: 217, 489, 503, 2: 155, 168-169. 56 Ibn al-Murtaḍā 1969 : 117 (probably following Jishumī 1973 claims that ʿAbd al-Jabbār was one of Murtaḍā's teachers; Jishumī adds that the studentship was in Baghdad upon ʿAbd al-Jabbār's return from pilgrimage; Madelung 1985 dates it in 389/999. But Murtaḍā never alludes to such a connection even in al-Shāfī, despite the lengthy polemic against ʿAbd al-Jabbār. In addition, Murtaḍā's brother Raḍī mentions being a student of ʿAbd al-Jabbār himself; Raḍī 1967: 48, 180, 362. Jishumī might be confusing the two brothers, since he does not mention Raḍī therein. But if Murtaḍā did study under ʿAbd al-Jabbār, then it must have been for a short time, which explains why other biographers of Murtaḍā refrain from listing ʿAbd al-Jabbār among his teachers. 57 Cf. Murtaḍā 2000: 474 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 6{1}: 11. 58 Cf. Murtaḍā 2000: 322-324 and ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 17: 52-53. 59 According to Murtaḍā, ʿAbd al-Jabbār's methodology suffers from his unfair, inaccurate or even uninformed presentation of Imāmī views (Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 43, 73, 86-87, 96-98, 137, 167-168, 179, 210, 215, 318, 3: 72, 4: 117; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 18, 31-35, 37-38, 56, 69-70, 75, 79, 91-92, 181, 336) , in addition to his facile use of slander against his opponents (Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 38, 90; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 13) . To show his ability to reciprocate such methodology, Murtaḍā surveys many of the peculiar views ascribed to early Muʿtazilīs, many of which were renounced by later generations; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 90-96. Another problem with ʿAbd al-Jabbār's methodology is in his use of sources, as he seems to either misunderstand the authors' intentions or worse, to deliberately manipulate (taḥrīf) the quoted text to serve his position -as Murtaḍā tries to show by quoting those sources; Murtaḍā 1986: 2: 247, 321, 4: 249, 256, 347; ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{1}: 138-139, 155-156, {2}: 50, 89 . Also, ʿAbd al-Jabbār's use of terminology, according to Murtaḍā, is imprecise; Murtaḍā 1986: 4: 216, 236; cf. ʿAbd al-Jabbār 1966: 20{2}: 20-26, 45-47 . 60 See for example Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 76-83, 103-107, 143-145, 204-205; 2: 14-21, 26-36, 56-57, 125-126; 3: 5-7, 18-20, 23-25, 63-64; 4: 14-17, 32-36, 90-94, 110-113. 61 In the introduction to al-Dharīʿa, Murtaḍā states that the book is unprecedented because his views on jurisprudence are not fully shared by any author. Nonetheless, he mentions that many of these problematic questions were covered in his now lost Masāʾil al-Khilāf and in his discussion of ʿAbd al-Jabbār's al-ʿUmad (both edited texts of al-Dharīʿa mention it under its less commonly 4 Murtaḍā's position on the question of divine decree and determining is, as has been mentioned, identical to that of the Baṣran Muʿtazilīs. Murtaḍā considers the question part of the debate on divine justice which he deems complementary to divine unicity as the two essential components of sound doctrine; 62 this position is to be read in his various theological works, be they in the form of books -with extremely elaborate discussions -or shorter treatises where his order of priorities cannot be mistaken 63 . In addition to his discussion of the problem in his various works of undisputed authenticity, the aforesaid treatise entitled Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-l-Qadar -solely dedicated to the question of human agency in relation to divine will -is also ascribed to him.
Murtaḍā
There 68 it must not be confused with the work in question, as its surviving text shows. Therefore, the discussion below excludes the possibility of this text being a misidentified version of ʿĀmirī's work 69 .
Synopsis of the content
Following the classical formulaic expressions thanking God and praising His messenger and his household, the author turns to address an anonymous requester who asked him to dictate a treatise on divine decree and determining. The reason is that the people of al-Nīl 70 -all of its commoners and most of the resthave been led astray as to believe in determinism, mainly due to their reliance on endorsement of reason and free will are indispensable tools to help the progress of the ArabMuslim nation in all respects: political, scientific, intellectual and moral (pp. 38-42). The ideological coloring of such rhetoric cannot be mistaken; one must bear in mind that it was written during the early 1970s when the then dominant discourse of leftist-Arab nationalism was starting to give way to the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism. The strength of both discourses is readily felt in the introduction; their later fortunes are also reflected in the career of ʿAmāra himself, a prolific author of more than 200 works who subsequently drifted towards a much more religious worldview; see for example his recent Izālat al-Shubuhāt for an accurate assessment of his current positions since the book spans his conceptual world, offering 147 definitions of various terms. Paradoxically, having edited Murtaḍā's work at some point earlier in his career, ʿAmāra resorted to a blatantly anti-Shīʿī -particularly Imāmī -rhetoric in recent years (as in ʿAmāra, 2010: 471-473, 523-529, 549-551) The most likely place to be meant by the author is the town of al-Nīl in the countryside of Kūfa, as attested by the phrasing which leaves the impression of a town or city thus named; the other two options are rivers, to which the author is unlikely to refer in the feminine voice or to make a construct such as ʿawāmm al-nīl and khawāṣṣihā; see Ḥamawī 1997: 5: 334-339. traditions of unknown provenance or equivocal meaning or because of confused understanding of some Qurʾānic verses. [177] [178] The author, while affirming the complexity of the problem, stresses that the starting point of the whole discussion must be knowing what ought to be said of God and what ought not; only then can one distinguish between the right and the wrong positions. He then provides a succinct exposé of the history of the debate on the identity of the party responsible for human sins and the nature of human agency. According to him, the root of the controversy is the view voiced by some people who first ascribed human sins to God; in early days, the whole debate was restricted to this question. This group was immediately denounced by the scholars of the time. [178] [179] [180] Later, the discussion developed into a more complex debate, pertaining to the createdness of human acts and the nature of agency and power. Erroneous views ascribing acts of God eventually branched into three main ones, all being determinist: (1) absolute determinism, in the sense that God creates everything and humans, being but tools of divine will, are utterly powerless; (2) that God creates human acts, but humans effect them by virtue of a prior power that they have and (3) that God creates human acts, but humans effect them by virtue of a power created in humans simultaneous with the occurrence of the act. The last view, the author claims, is the most common among all determinists. [180] [181] [182] [183] The people of the right faith are aware that all Muslims agree on a number of arguments that set Islam apart from wrong religions. Nevertheless, these people are also mindful of the myriad disagreements among Muslims. Matters of disagreement can be analyzed by reason, then checked with the yardstick of the Qurʾān and the tradition of the Prophet so that the right may be sifted from the wrong. An obligation then falls upon the people of the right faith to spread their call, since the other position leads to all sorts of heinous attitudes, such as believing in the possibility of God committing evil acts, being like his creatures and disbelieving the prophets. Then a brief dogma on the unicity of God is stated; it rejects anthropomorphism, denies God's corporeality and upholds that the Qurʾān is not pre-eternal. [183] [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] The core question of the treatise, i.e. God's justice, is then tackled. The author believes that God never obligates people to the impossible; He only holds them accountable for what they have done. Moreover, it cannot be that He does vile acts committed by them, such as injustice and instances of illicit behavior. The author's opponents, on the other hand, allow that God obligate people to do what they cannot do and punish them afterwards; also, these opponents have no qualms about ascribing to God vile acts that appear in this world at the hands of humans, despite Qurʾānic statements to the contrary. The logical conclusion of this position, he claims, is that God is more considerate towards His enemies than His friends; the latter cannot trust His goodwill despite their efforts, whereas the former can always hope for it regardless of their sins. [189] [190] [191] [192] [193] The hardships and material happenings of the world are created by God; but they cannot be called evil (sharr) as these might be in fact instances of wisdom and justice. Evil, in the form of sins, is effected by humans due to the whispering and temptation of the devil; this, in turn, is supported by ample scriptural evidence from the Qurʾān and the sayings of the Prophet. [193] [194] [195] [196] [197] [198] [199] [200] [201] [202] [203] The author then moves to provide rational, i.e. independent from scripture, arguments for his understanding of God's justice. The first basis of the argument is that whoever does an act merits the corresponding attribute arising from being its agent; whoever lies is a liar, whoever does injustice is unjust and so on. But no one can describe God as such, so He must not be taken as the agent of such acts. In addition, the agent of vile acts is more blameworthy than any other party in relation to these acts, i.e. whoever commands them is less blameworthy than whoever does them. So ascribing them to God would make Him blameworthy and He can no longer blame humans for these acts. Therefore, God is neither the sole agent nor does He have any share of agency in relation to these acts; this goes both against pure determinists and against the upholders of acquisition who still allow that God be responsible, one way or another, for the creation of acts. [203] [204] [205] [206] [207] Following is a list of questions, built around scenarios designed to corner the opponents unless they relinquish their position. In this context, it becomes clearer that the opponents are not pure determinists but the upholders of acquisition, as all the questions aim to force them into adopting the position of pure determinists -which they must be disavowing -or accept the author's proposition on sole human agency not subject to divine intervention. The core of all these scenarios is the problematic position that God is unjust; he can create people's sins and punish them, or lie to people and hold them accountable for believing these lies. To deny one's creation of his own acts is to deny the evidence of senses and thus should not have been elaborately discussed had it not been for the ignorance which clouds the other party's judgment. [207] [208] [209] [210] [211] [212] [213] [214] [215] [216] Having attacked his opponents' position, the author moves on to defend his. For this, he explains away linguistic difficulties accruing from certain Qurʾānic passages pertaining to the notion that God is the creator of everything, divine decree (qaḍāʾ), as well as the meaning of guidance (hudā ) and being astray (ḍalāl ). In all such cases, God is understood to be responsible for creating the beings of the world and ordaining the good acts of humans in it. As for the twin concepts of guidance and being astray, the true understanding is that God points out the way of guidance and punishes humans for being astray from it if they choose to do so. An elaborate list of relevant Qurʾānic verses is accounted for, with the author's interpretation of each. [216] [217] [218] [219] [220] [221] [222] [223] [224] [225] [226] [227] [228] [229] This leads to a discussion of the apparent conflict between divine will and human agency seen in the Qurʾān; here, the author points out the theological difficulties arising from accepting the proposition that God wills vile acts, especially in relation to consequences affecting moral theory. He then proceeds to reconcile his understanding of divine omnipotence and human will without sacrificing either, which is the classical problem of the author's position. For this, he goes over a copious survey of the occurrences of will and its derivatives in the Qurʾān. [229] [230] [231] [232] [233] [234] [235] [236] [237] [238] [239] Finally, the treatise concludes with a long survey of sayings, anecdotes and short comments on Qurʾānic verses from the Prophet and early Muslim authorities to support the author's viewpoint on divine decree and divine will in relation to human acts. [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] [244] [245] [246] [247] 
5
Analysis
The general content of the treatise agrees with Murtaḍā's thesis that it is only humans who effect their acts and that God is in no way intervening in them. In addition, the criticisms of the other viewpoint also concur with many of his attacks on the upholders of the opposite position. However, despite such an agreement, analysis of the content in light of Murtaḍā's corpus reveals discrepancies on many levels -leading to (1) stylistic, (2) terminological, (3) conceptual, (4) sectarian and (5) bibliographic problems. Though not amounting to a radical deviation from Murtaḍā's initial position on this question, these problems contribute not only to question the authenticity of authorship, but even to develop a negative judgment on the matter. Below is a succinct discussion of these various discrepancies.
(
1) Stylistic Points
The style of the treatise, conspicuously different from Murtaḍā's, casts doubt on its authenticity; already noticeable in the early sections of the text, this dissimilarity increasingly unfolds in various stylistic aspects. (1.1) The author employs rhymed prose (sajʿ ) frequently, 71 although it rarely appears in Murtaḍā's prolific output, even the literary compilations -not to speak of legal and theological 71 Aside from the opening lines which, although heavily rhymed, may be seen as a natural venue for sajʿ, see for example Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 works. (1.2) Also, the phrasing is more relaxed, unlike Murtaḍā's succinct sentences. (1.3) In addition, the passionate polemical spirit, mostly hostile and fervent, 72 is not to be seen in his works, usually characterized by a very cerebral tone even when touching on most sensitive topics and taking uncompromising positions, as noted in his discussion of the Imāma; 73 the same can be said about the tone of admonition dominating certain sections 74 . (1.4) Another stylistic aspect is the author's repetition of refrains at the end of sections, 75 which is not to be seen anywhere in Murtaḍā's writings.
(2) Terminological Points
The use of certain terms is also foreign to Murtaḍā's output. (2.1) This is evident in the author's conspicuous preference for the phrase 'our Lord' (rabbunā) in reference to God, as is obvious from its frequent occurrence; 76 on the other hand, Murtaḍā very rarely uses it, except when quoting other texts, as observed from surveying his corpus. (2.2) Also, the author uses the terms ḥamd and ajr for praise and reward respectively, 77 whereas Murtaḍā consistently sticks to madḥ and thawāb 78 . (2.3) The terms 'People of the Qibla' (ahl al-qibla) 79 and 'the Religion of the People of the Qibla' (dīn ahl al-qibla) 80 in reference to Muslims and Islam respectively are frequently used; nevertheless, Murtaḍā seems to use the first sparingly and only in legal contexts 81 or quotations, 82 while never the second.
(2.4) In a couple of instances, the author uses afāʾīl -as the plural form of fiʿl -for 'acts,' 83 although this form seems to never appear in Murtaḍā's corpus, Murtaḍā 1995: 33-35; Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 293-294. 74 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 185-186. 75 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 , 239 (where he reiterates that he is concerned with keeping the text within reasonable length); Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 (where he asks the reader to reciprocate the arguments of the opponents against them); Murtaḍā 1985-1990: 2: 193 and 228 (where he stresses that no friend of God would trust Him nor would His enemy fear Him). 76 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 177, 187, 189, 195, 205, 217, 218, 227, 231. 77 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 78 See for example the taxonomy in Murtaḍā 1990a: 276-277; Murtaḍā 1998b : 131-132. 79 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 184, 185, 187. 80 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 209, 210, 212, 215. 81 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 Murtaḍā 1998c : 302. 82 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 94, 2: 93, 4: 321; Murtaḍā 1954 : 1: 178. 83 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 an absence most noted throughout his discussion of the question of human acts. (2.5) The phrase 'Knowledgeable People of Unicity' (ʿulamāʾ al-tawḥīd ) 84 seems not to have been used in Murtaḍā's corpus, since he prefers 'People of Unicity' (ahl al-tawḥīd) in this regard 85 . (2.6) The word miskīn is used in reference to an individual's weak mental ability or lack of knowledge; 86 this usage, although metaphorical and rare, 87 is avoided by Murtaḍā who does not even propose it as an option in relation to its possible meanings in certain Qurʾānic contexts. 88 (2.7) The author refers to the Ashʿarīs as ashāʿira; 89 however, Murtaḍā does not use this word, even in his lengthy discussions of theological controversies where this group -or those who would be thus dubbed -is taken as the main rival. In his extant corpus, the only time he comes close to using the term ashāʿira is when he speaks of "the attributionists, followers of al-Ashʿarī" (al-ṣifātiyya aṣḥāb al-ashʿarī ) 90 . (2.8) For the determinists, the author uses terms derived from both roots, J-B-R (mujbira, 91 jabriyya 92 ) and Q-D-R (qadariyya) 93 -the latter being more frequent. Nevertheless, Murtaḍā is univocally on the other side of this usage preference; he is consistent in his choice of J-B-R derivations referring to his adversaries. 94 (2.9) Throughout the text, the only phrase used in reference to Imams is "the Imams of guidance" (aʾimmat al-hudā), 95 an expression unusual in Murtaḍā's writings as it does not seem to appear anywhere in his output. (2.10) The author uses mashīʾa and irāda equally and interchangeably in speaking about God's will. 96 True, Murtaḍā deems the two synonymous; 97 but he almost restricts his 84 Murtaḍā -1990 : 2: 181. 85 Murtaḍā 1986 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 1: 397, 3: 125. 86 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 233. 87 Ibn Manẓūr 1967 -1981 : S-K-N in the sense of being in a bad condition. 88 See his discussion of Q19:79 in Murtaḍā 1986c: 179-180; this, of course, casting aside the more technical aspect pertaining to the legal discussion on eligibility to benefit from alms, where the term retains the sense of material want and poverty. 89 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 183. 90 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 4: 27. 91 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 190. 92 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 243. 93 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 190, 242, 243. 94 Murtaḍā 2000 Murtaḍā 1998b: 99; Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 48, 499, 2: 211; Murtaḍā 1986: 1: 83, 86, 4: 317; Murtaḍā 1998c: 98 . The only exception occurs in Murtaḍā 2009: 507 where the discussion is semantic but not polemic, related to how the verb 'to believe in' (yarā) is used. 95 Murtaḍā -1990 : 2: 177. 96 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 192, 236, 239. 97 Murtaḍā 2000 Murtaḍā 1990a: 600; Murtaḍā 1954: 1: 507-509, 2: 78. use of the term mashīʾa to quoting Qurʾānic verses where the verb (shāʾa, yashāʾ ) appears, or to the formulaic expression "God willing" (bi-mashīʾat allāh); using it to refer to the theological concept of God's will is not in harmony with his style as he consistently sticks to irāda instead 98 .
(2.11) The phrase 'the default state of our reason' (fiṭrat ʿuqūlinā ), 99 laden with connotations, is not used by Murtaḍā. The term fiṭra he takes to mean the way something is created (khilqa); 100 thus it would only have a meaning in this context if Murtaḍā believes that reason can be altered. But for him, reason is strictly defined and is not susceptible to changes that would take it far from its default state: it is a subset of knowledge (ʿilm), dealing with types of knowledge whose goal is to help a person acquire the knowledge of his religious duties and perform them as ordained; 101 being necessary knowledge, all of these types are effected in us by God and are thus unchangeable 102 . Therefore, the word fiṭra in the phrase, based on his jargon, is redundant. 104 Although both agree eventually that it is God who creates the human act, the disagreement has to do with whether the human power to act (istiṭāʿa) is created prior to the act or simultaneously with it; the followers of Ashʿarī belong in the latter category. 105 Nevertheless, Murtaḍā seems to have a different understanding of the question where he lumps these two figures under the same school and ignores the question of human power; Ashʿarī, he states, has a view distinct from both. 106 (3.2) In addition, it is worth noting that the author and Murtaḍā have different names to enumerate the main theologians pertinent to the discussion, which would be a strange occurrence if done by the same author. 107 (3. 3) The line of reasoning is also different from Murtaḍā's, as in placing rational arguments last in enumeration, preceded by the Qurʾān, Prophetic traditions and consensus, 108 or in making rational speculation subservient to scriptural requirements 109 . This order is not Murtaḍā's standard line of reasoning in theology, given some of his categorical theological positions. For Murtaḍā, the question of human agency belongs to the realm of moral principles deducible by unaided reason; it relates to the axioms that it is vile to obligate to the impossible (qubḥ al-taklīf bi-mā lā yuṭāq) and to do injustice (ẓulm) in the form of punishing someone for an act of which he is not the agent. These axioms are accepted by all rational beings, regardless of their religious beliefs and independently from any revelation. Questioning them would jeopardize the whole structure of religion, since it opens the door for the possibility of God's committing all forms of vile acts, eventually leading to deceit which undermines the reliability of revelation, as the classical Muʿtazilī argument -endorsed by Murtaḍā -goes. 110 (3.4) Then we are faced with the problem of using non-multi-attested reports (akhbār al-āḥād). (3.4.1) The author's objection to his opponents' reliance on equivocal reports, without him mentioning that these are non-multi-attested, is conspicuous. 111 Murtaḍā usually points out this problem as his main argumentative tactic as seen from surveying his writings on different theological questions, 112 since he invokes it based on epistemological reasons rooted in his understanding of knowledge and the means to acquire it 113 . (3.4.2) But not only does the author fail to invoke this objection in his opponents' faces; rather, the divergence from Murtaḍā's position is made even starker by the author's extreme reliance on non-multi-attested traditions to buttress his own arguments. 114 Since these reports cannot produce certain knowledge, they are insufficient in matters of secondary importance such as the particulars of religious law, let alone the foundations of doctrines which are the subject of the treatise. 115 But even if the validity of these reports is granted, the controversy in question belongs solely to the realm of speculation about God which, according to Murtaḍā's theology, must not depend on revelation, for the reasons enumerated above, i.e. the logical precedence of establishing the vileness of deceit over the reliability of any report, no matter how well established; so the recurrent use of these traditions stands in contrast to his general approach. 116 (3.5) Moreover, the author's view on the legitimate source for divine names and attributes seems to have been different from Murtaḍā's; he is more inclined to rule that revelation and not reason is the source of these names and attributes, 117 whereas Murtaḍā confines the role of revelation to prohibiting certain names of God that reason would otherwise have legitimized. 118 (3.6) In addition, the author argues from a pure linguistic standpoint; that is to say that the agent of an act of injustice is unjust (fāʾil al-ẓulm ẓālim), which leads to the situation -supposedly unacceptable to the opponent -that ascribing acts of injustice to God would legitimize calling Him unjust. The same line of argument is also used for other derivations of vile acts such as instances of purposelessness and corruption in relation to their agents and other acts that, though not vile, cannot be ascribed to God such as instances of compliance and obedience. 119 This logic runs contrary to Murtaḍā's reasoning as attested in his writings where he stresses the point that concepts enjoy logical precedence over terms and not otherwise. 120 (3.7) The analogy of obedience to kings with that to God, usually used by determinists to argue that it infringes on God's omnipotence not to be obeyed by his creatures, is rejected by the author. He judges such an analogy fallacious on several grounds, the first being that the king lacks authority, power and knowledge: he is in no position to bring people under moral obligation, nor is he able to unconditionally deliver the consequences of acts nor can he asses the proper magnitude of reward and punishment. 121 Murtaḍā deals with the same scenario in his theological writings; nonetheless, he does not bring up these objections. Rather, his rejection of the analogy is based on the fact that the king, unlike God, is likely to be affected by his subjects' disobedience. 122 That this answer is used by the author as his second choice 123 indicates a different order of argumentative priorities and thought processes than Murtaḍā's. (4.1.3) This divergence from the Imāmī spirit can be read in the many traditions the author relates on the authority of the famous Companion Abū Hurayra (d. 57/676-677) who is considered particularly infamous by Imāmīs, Murtaḍā not being an exception, for more than the theological reasons used to stigmatize other Companions. 127 (4.1.4) The whole work concludes with an episode from none other than the second caliph ʿUmar, whereby the author urges the readers to consider the example of ʿUmar's reaction to heavy obligations. 128 Given Murtaḍā's views on the Companions in general, 129 and ʿUmar in particular, 130 it is extremely unlikely that he defers to his authority. (4.1.5) Moreover, a number of individuals are praised both for being knowledgeable (ʿulamāʾ) and among the first to have rejected the claim that God creates people's vile acts; although it is plausible that Murtaḍā did praise some of these individuals, even against the general Imāmī ethos, it is highly unlikely that he lauded all of them. 131
123 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 232. 124 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 185. 125 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 126 See Kohlberg 1976b : particularly 96-98. 127 Murtaḍā 1954 Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 . For other early Imāmīs see for example, Ṣadūq 1983: 19; Mufīd 1993b: 78; Mufīd 1993a : 23. 128 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 2: 246-247. 129 Murtaḍā 1986 Murtaḍā 1990a: 495, 535-536; Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 Murtaḍā 1998b : 235. 130 Murtaḍā 1986 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 : 1: 290-291, 3: 148-150. 131 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 ; for example Muṭarrif b. ʿAbdullāh, who is reputed to not have been a supporter of ʿAlī, or even to have disliked him. In addition, his extremely hagiographic biographies in Sunnī sources, with the absence of any reference to him having believed that God has nothing to do with human sins, suggests that he probably did not hold such a view in the (4.2) Another indicator is to be seen in the fact that the author never quotes any of the Imams qua Imams; that ʿAlī is mentioned here should be seen in the context of invoking the Companions' authority. 132 (4.3) Certain formulaic expressions are strange to the Imāmī spirit. An example is the phrase "the Qurʾān is our Imam/book" (al-qurʾān imāmunā); 133 true that this may still be taken as a legitimate, though infrequent, use of the term 'imām' to mean 'a book,' 134 but this would not be an Imāmī's first choice, let alone its almost polemical, anti-Shīʿī tone in the context of sloganeering at the beginning of the statement of dogma.
The whole problematic aspect of the potential sectarian affiliation of the content discussed above cannot be easily ascribed to cautionary prudence (taqiyya), if one still takes Murtaḍā as the author. Many reasons militate against such an assumption. First and foremost, Murtaḍā's social status made him immune to such a practice, especially given the favorable vicissitudes of time under the Būyids. Second, according to his own legal views, this is not an instance of permissible cautionary prudence, since the author opens by stating that he is replying to the inquiry of a community of people about religious matters. 135 Third, even if cautionary prudence is granted, Murtaḍā's style would still allow him a better and more elusive way of expressing that which he would not accept as an Imāmī, whereas the current text does not show any nuisances -or even an effort in that direction -meant to hide a different attitude of the author than what the prima-facie reading of the text suggests. 136 There remains, of course, the possibility that he was addressing a non-Imāmī audience and writing this way to persuade them, but his biography does not betray any interest in addressing other communities aside from debating their authors. In addition, such an assumption is untenable because Murtaḍā's reputation as a leader -or at least one of the leaders -of the Imāmī community would make any such tactic useless in the eyes of this presumed audience, especially first place, given the hypersensitivity of the subject which does not allow for great toleration. So it is unlikely that Murtaḍā refers to him positively given these two issues, let alone the possible factual mistake regarding his actual position on divine decree and determining; on him, see Ibn Saʿd 1998: 7: 141-146; Ibn Abī al-Ḥadīd 1959 -1964 Dhahabī 1993: 4: 187-195; Dhahabī 1987: 6: 481-483; Ibn Ḥajar 1995: 6: 205-206; Ibn Ḥajar 1984: 10: 157-158. given his declared positions on sensitive points such as the status of the Companions and the question of the Imāma.
(5) Bibliographic Points
Examination of the bio-bibliographic sources also leaves one with serious doubts regarding Murtaḍā's alleged connection to the current treatise. (5.1) Thus, another pointer that undermines the ascription of the work to Murtaḍā is that the author mentions a book of his entitled Ṣafwat al-Naẓar as a reference work dedicated to the interpretation of ambiguous verses on the question, suggesting that it is both elaborate and well-known. This title, however, is neither to be found in the accounts of Murtaḍā's works, nor does he speak of such a work despite his habitual references to his other works by name, 137 nor is the content of any of his works congruous with this allusion. His complementary al-Mulakhkhaṣ and al-Dhakhīra, which contain a lengthy discussion on human agency, cannot be meant here because of their content which does not correspond to the author's remark, in addition to the fact that Murtaḍā makes frequent references to them, only by this title; 138 so it is unlikely that the title Ṣafwat al-Naẓar be another title for either al-Mulakhkhaṣ or al-Dhakhīra. Assuming it is a different work while still wanting to ascribe it to Murtaḍā would pose two questions: (5.1.1) first, why Murtaḍā, contrary to his habit, never alerts readers to such a book in his responses to pertinent questions where he mentions al-Mulakhkhaṣ or al-Dhakhīra and (5.1.2) second, why the author of Ṣafwat al-Naẓar and Inqādh al-Bashar min al-Jabr wa-lQadar mentions neither al-Mulakhkhaṣ nor al-Dhakhīra.
Admittedly, the last argument suffers three problems; first, it is an argumentum ex silentio; second, there is the possibility of al-Mulakhkhaṣ and al-Dhakhīra not having yet been compiled at the time of writing the treatise in question; third, there is the possibility that the title Ṣafwat al-Naẓar be initially the title of a work by Murtaḍā that is now known by some other name. Nonetheless, the argument is proposed to deal with these challenges within the limitations of the current information. It is still a reliable way to have a reasonable assessment of authorship, given Murtaḍā's frequent self-referencing in his works and the late date of some of them from which any mention of Ṣafwat al-Naẓar is still absent. The margin of error is there, but the fact that neither this treatise mentions any known work 137 Murtaḍā 1997: 442; Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1990 Murtaḍā 1995: 31, 36, 61, 71, 73; Murtaḍā 1998c : 277, 307, 349, 351. 138 Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 See Murtaḍā 1985 -1990 Murtaḍā 2009: 393, 395, 396 where Murtaḍā, having discussed similar questions, refers his reader to al-Mulakhkhaṣ as the main relevant work.
by Murtaḍā nor any of his works mention this treatise, coupled with the author's decision to reference himself in a way that does not quite fit into Murtaḍā's bibliographic records, should minimize this margin.
(5.2) Still, one must account for the possibility of the work having been written by Murtaḍā at an early stage in his career. A very early date of compilation may explain why he never refers to any of his works, assuming that all of them were written after this treatise; such a hypothesis would also take care of the difficulty arising from the discrepancy in style and terminology, since one can then propose that the writing style and terminological jargon of a young Murtaḍā were reasonably different from his later ones, even as early as al-Shāfī 139 whose style and terminology already betray considerable departure from the work under study. But this possibility can also be safely excluded by looking into Murtaḍā's bibliography. The early list of his works, prepared by his student Muḥammad b. Muḥam-mad al-Buṣrawī (d. 443/1051) 140 and ratified by Murtaḍā himself in Shaʿbān 417/ September 1026 mentions all his works composed up to that time, enumerating 57 items in total. 141 But neither Inqādh al-Bashar nor Ṣafwat al-Naẓar appear in the list; it is extremely unlikely that Murtaḍā fails to point out the absence of two early works of his, with one of them -i.e. Ṣafwat al-Naẓar -being supposedly an elaborate compilation. 142 ( 5.3) It should also be noted that the earliest source to list Inqādh al-Bashar among Murtaḍā's works is Maʿālim al-ʿUlamāʾ by Ibn Shahrāshūb (d. 588/1192) . It is the last item on the list, preceded by al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq with which it shares two aspects: first, al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq does not appear among Murtaḍā's works in any list before Ibn Shahrāshūb's; second, the content of al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq is even more problematic in its relationship to Murtaḍā's authentic writings. 143 Also, Murtaḍā's close associates such as the aforementioned Ṭūsī 139 His al-Shāfī is definitely the earliest of Murtaḍā's extant theological books, as he refers to it in almost all of them ; Murtaḍā 1998c: 300, 307; Murtaḍā 1990a: 409; Murtaḍā 2009: 431; Murtaḍā 1985 Murtaḍā -1995 . In his legal work Murtaḍā 1997: 442 he refers to al-Dhakhīra in which he refers to al-Shāfī. 140 On him see Baghdādī 1997: 3: 355-356; Amīn 1997: 9: 404; Khūʾī 1990: 15: 323 . 141 The earliest appearance of this list is in Iṣfahānī 1982 Iṣfahānī -1995 where the author claims to be copying from a manuscript with both Buṣrawī's and Murtaḍā's handwriting. Another published version is based on Ḥusayn Maḥfūẓ's copy of a manuscript; it appears in Murtaḍā, 1998a: 1: 126-132. The two versions are almost identical, with very minor differences probably due to misreading. 142 No work with such title was found despite my diligent searches in various venues. 143 As a preliminary indicator, the author of the current article was able to find 27 definitions of terms provided in al-Ḥudūd wa-l-Ḥaqāʾiq that differ from Murtaḍā's explicit definitions of the same terms; this aside from stylistic and less stark contradictions. and the famous Imāmī bio-bibliographer Abū al-ʿAbbās al-Najāshī (d. 450/1058) 144 fail to mention any of these two texts in their bio-bibliographic entries of Murtaḍā. 145 That both works make their first appearance in this relatively late compilation, their position at the end of the list and their problematic content leave us with either one of two explanations: that the two treatises were added later by manuscript handlers or -in case it is Ibn Shahrāshūb himself who listed them among Murtaḍā's works -that the ascription to Murtaḍā must have taken place within 150 years from his death.
Conclusion
The relevance of this article is to show how Murtaḍā's thought might have been misrepresented due to the similarities between his viewpoints and those of Muʿtazilī masters on the particular issue of divine decree and determining, which constitutes the core of the current treatise. Given the other positions taken by its author, the ascription of the text to Murtaḍā would certainly leave an inaccurate impression of his thought. On many matters where Murtaḍā sought to highlight the difference between his position and that of Muʿtazilīs, the author seems to adopt a view that contradicts Murtaḍā's, thus allowing for the misconception that Murtaḍā represented a form of Imāmī theology that was more accommodating of non-Imāmī viewpoints. It is hoped that the evidence presented against such an ascription would help situate Murtaḍā's thought within its context without having to make sense of the apparent divergence from mainstream Imāmī views that the treatise reflects. 144 As an indicator of Najāshī's association with Murtaḍā, when the latter died, his body was washed by Najāshī, the above-mentioned Sallār al-Daylamī and Abū Yaʿlā al-Jaʿfarī (d. 465/1072). 1997: 164-165; Najāshī 1995: 270-271. 
Ṭūsī
